Citizenship

Tecson vs. COMELEC (GR. 161434)

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution:

“No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.”

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines –

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution

(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution – The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon and Serra vs. Republic.

What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated. (PP vs. Cayat)

While the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

RP vs. Sagun (GR 187567)

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that [t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.

Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied.

Sobejana-Condon VS. COMELEC (GR. 198742)

Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.

The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.

The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.

In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos  who re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public oftice.

The petitioner’s failure to comply in accordance with the exact tenor of the law rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for public office.

De Guzman VS. COMELEC (GR 180048)

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying him from running as Vice-Mayor because of his failure to renounce his American citizenship, and in dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being moot.

An issue becomes moot when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.  In this case, the pendency of petitioners election protest assailing the results of the election did not render moot the motion for reconsideration which he filed assailing his disqualification. Stated otherwise, the issue of petitioners citizenship did not become moot; the resolution of the issue remained relevant because it could significantly affect the outcome of the election protest. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office.

Contrary to petitioners claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Our rulings in the cases of Frivaldo andMercado are not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.

In Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, the Court ruled that a candidates oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Thus:

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

AASJS VS. Hon. Datumanong (GR 160869)

Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance. The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest.

To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.  Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

Mercado Vs. Manzano (GR 135083)

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely a Philippine national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

 

 

 

 

 

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Author: Born2drinkStuff

SEO/Content/Article/BMR Writer

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