Republic Act 7610. Anti-Child Abuse Law

R.A. 7610 – An Act providing for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination, providing penalties for its violation and for other purposes.

Pp vs. Dahilig (GR: 187083)

The question now is what crime has been committed? Is it Rape (Violation of Article 266-A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353), or is it Child Abuse, defined and penalized by Sec. 5, (b), R.A. No. 7610?

As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the elements of both crimes are present in this case. The case of People v. Abay, however, is enlightening and instructional on this issue. It was stated in that case that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act.

Garingarao vs. PP (GR: 192760)

Garingarao alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision finding him guilty of acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610. Garingarao insists that it was physically impossible for him to commit the acts charged against him because there were many patients and hospital employees around. He alleges that AAAs room was well lighted and that he had an assistant when the incident allegedly occurred. Garingarao further alleges that, assuming the charges were correct, there was only one incident when he allegedly touched AAA and as such, he should have been convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610.

We do not agree.

In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts and inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by pretending that his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAAs objections. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that he was just examining her.


The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:

  1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
  2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
  3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610, lascivious conduct is defined as follows:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.


The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not. Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is enough to hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610.

Sanchez Vs. PP, CA (GR: 179090)

Resolution: J. Nachura

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated February 20, 2007 which affirmed the Decision dated July 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, convicting appellant Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo (appellant) of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, with a modification of the penalty imposed.


The instant Petition is bereft of merit.

Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.


Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but merely as slight physical injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution.  As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant’s contention.

De Ocampo vs. Hon. Sec. of Justice (GR:147932)

Petitioners single act of allegedly banging the heads of her students had two distinct victims, namely Ronald and Lorendo. Therefore, petitioner has to face prosecution for cruelty to each victim. For Ronalds death, petitioner is being charged with homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, this does not mean that petitioner is being charged with the distinct offenses of homicide and child abuse for Ronalds death. On the other hand, for her cruelty to Lorendo, petitioner is being charged with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 punishable by prision mayor in its minimum period.

Contrary to petitioners contention, Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 is clear. This provision reads:

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one interpretation. In the present case, petitioner fails to show convincingly the ambiguity in Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610.

Section 3(b), Article VI of RA 7610 defines child abuse as the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes physical abuse and cruelty. Petitioners alleged banging of the heads of Ronald and Lorendo is clearly an act of cruelty.

PP vs. CA, Olayon (GR 171863)

The record shows that the Pasig City Prosecutors Office found that the acts of respondent did not amount to rape as they were done with the consent of the 14-year old AAA. Nevertheless, it found the acts constitutive of violations of [Republic] Act No. 7610, hence, its filing of the above-quoted Informations for violation of Section 10(a).

The Informations alleged that respondent, with lewd designs did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with and commit lewd and lascivious acts upon the person of [AAA], a minor, fourteen (14) years of age.



For consensual sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a minor, who is not exploited in prostitution, to thus fall within the purview of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of the child must be present.

In the case at bar, even if respondent were charged under Section 5(b), instead of Section 10(a), respondent would just the same have been acquitted as there was no allegation that an element of the offense coercion or influence or intimidation attended its commission.



Anti-Rape Law (RA8353)

De Castro vs. Judge Fernandez, Jr. (GR 155041)

Petitioner also questions the charge filed against him by the prosecutor. Petitioner insists that a finger does not constitute an object or instrument in the contemplation of RA 8353.

Petitioner is mistaken. Under the present law on rape, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353, and as interpreted in People v. Soriano, the insertion of ones finger into the genital of another constitutes rape through sexual assault. Hence, the prosecutor did not err in charging petitioner with the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

People vs. Dahilig (GR 187083)

Clearly, the accused sexually abused AAA.

The question now is what crime has been committed? Is it Rape (Violation of Article 266-A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353), or is it Child Abuse, defined and penalized by Sec. 5, (b), R.A. No. 7610?

As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the elements of both crimes are present in this case. The case of People v. Abay, however, is enlightening and instructional on this issue. It was stated in that case that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act.

Accordingly, the accused can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and be convicted therefor. Considering, however, that the information correctly charged the accused with rape in violation of Article 266-A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and that he was convicted therefor, the CA should have merely affirmed the conviction.

People vs. Dollano, Jr (GR 188851)

It is significant to note that in Criminal Case Nos. 1381 and 1382 against AAA, the rape incidents occurred prior to the effectivity of RA 8353, or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 which took effect on October 22, 1997 and classified the crime of rape as a crime against persons. Thus, we apply the old law and treat the acts of rape as private crimes. As provided in Article 344 of the RPC, for crimes of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, pardon and marriage extinguish criminal liability. However, pardon should have been made prior to the institution of the criminal actions.

In this case, AAA gave her testimony in court during the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. After the prosecution rested its case and during the presentation of the evidence for the defense, AAA again testified to tell the court that she lied when she first testified thereby recanting her previous testimony. Clearly, even if we consider the recantation as pardon on the part of the offended party in favor of appellant, the same cannot be appreciated for purposes of acquitting the accused as it was given definitely after the institution of the criminal action. Once the case is filed in court, control of the prosecution is removed from the offended party’s hands and any change of heart by the victim will not affect the states right to vindicate the atrocity committed against itself. It must be stressed that the true aggrieved party in a criminal prosecution is the People of the Philippines whose collective sense of morality, decency and justice has been outraged.

In Criminal Case Nos. 1387 and 1388, the rape incidents were committed when RA 8353 was already effective wherein rape was considered as a crime against person. The recantation became less significant.





Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act (RA 9262) as Explained in Cases

Ang vs. CA (GR 182835)

The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.


The Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustans low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of todays youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irishs head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.


R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines dating relationship while Section 3(f) defines sexual relations. The latter refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child. The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.

Dolina vs. Vallecera (GR 182367)

This case is about a mothers claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged child, which she sought in an action for the issuance of a temporary protection order that she brought against the supposed father.


Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence.  Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support.

Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child. But it became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action was to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the father. He of course vigorously denied this.

Go-Tan vs. Sps. Tan (GR 168852)

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ”violence against women and their children” as any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.


With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law.Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.


How the Crime of Plunder is Defined and Penalized (Republic Act 7080)

Estrada vs. SandiganBayan (GR 148560)

As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.

On whether the Plunder law is unconstitutional for being vague:

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.


In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute.


The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove allthese fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.


The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

Organo vs. Sandiganbayan (133535)

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

This latest enactment collated the provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is a special law enacted to declog the Sandiganbayan of “small fry” cases. In an unusual manner, the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to depend not on the penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and salary grade of accused government officials and employees.

However, the crime of “plunder” defined in Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan “until otherwise provided by law.”  Republic Act No. 8429, enacted on February 5, 1997 is the special law that provided for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan “otherwise” than that prescribed in Republic Act No. 7080.

Consequently, we rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade “27” or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though none of the accused occupied positions with Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, entitling petitioner to the relief prayed for.

Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan (GR 170122)

Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379( Unexplained wealth Act). RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.

It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all efforts should be exerted to harmonize and give effect to all laws and provisions on the same subject. To be sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080 can very well be harmonized. The Court perceives no irreconcilable conflict between them. One can be enforced without nullifying the other.



The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (RA 9165) Explained based on Supreme Court Decisions

The Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002 also known as RA 9165 repealed RA no. 6425. It was signed onto law by then President macapagal-Arroyo on June 7, 2002 and took effect on July 4, 2002.

Below are some of the Supreme Court Decisions applying and/or interpreting the provisions of RA 9165.

Asiatico vs. People (GR 195005)

For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements:

(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug;

(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and

(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

All these elements were duly established by the prosecution. Rosana was found to have in her possession 0.05 gram of shabu. There was nothing in the records showing that she had authority to possess it. Jurisprudence also teaches Us that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation. Rosana also failed to present contrary evidence to rebut her possession of the shabu.

People of the Phils. vs. Umipang (GR 190321)

Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she was convicted. This is especially true when the lapses in procedure were recognized and explained in terms of [] justifiable grounds. There must also be a showing that the police officers intended to comply with the procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason.

However, when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence.  This uncertainty cannot be remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties.  As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.

For the arresting officers failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to conclude from the totality of the procedural lapses committed in this case that the arresting officers deliberately disregarded the legal safeguards under R.A. 9165. These lapses effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame-up. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, as every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Pimentel vs. Comelec (GR 161658)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

SJS vs. DDB, PDEA (GR 157870)

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.


Laserna Petition:

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.

When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.  To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.  Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

People vs. Fundales, Jr. (GR 184606)

Section 86 of RA No. 9165 deals with inter-agency relations of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies with the PDEA. It is an administrative provision designating the PDEA as the lead agency in dangerous drugs cases. We have already ruled that nothing in RA No. 9165 suggests that it is the intention of the legislature to make an arrest in drugs cases illegal if made without the participation of the PDEA. In the implementing rules and regulations of RA No. 9165, Section 86(a) clearly states:

“(a) Relationship/Coordination between the PDEA and Other Agencies. – The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of the PDEA xxx Provided, finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement personnel and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.” 

Suffice it to state that in this case, the danger of abuse that the provision seeks to prevent is not present. We therefore see no reason why the non-participation of the PDEA would render the arrest illegal and the evidence obtained therein inadmissible considering that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized prohibited substances and dangerous drugs have been properly preserved.