Provisional Remedies: Receivership

Chavez vs. CA (GR 174356)

We hold that the CA erred in granting receivership over the property in dispute in this case. For one thing, a petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the prevention of imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy is not receivership.

Sps. Larrobis vs. Philippine Veterans Bank (GR 135706)

When a bank is declared insolvent and placed under receivership, the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, determines whether to proceed with the liquidation or reorganization of the financially distressed bank. A receiver, who concurrently represents the bank, then takes control and possession of its assets for the benefit of the banks creditors. A liquidator meanwhile assumes the role of the receiver upon the determination by the Monetary Board that the bank can no longer resume business. His task is to dispose of all the assets of the bank and effect partial payments of the banks obligations in accordance with legal priority. In both receivership and liquidation proceedings, the bank retains its juridical personality notwithstanding the closure of its business and may even be sued as its corporate existence is assumed by the receiver or liquidator. The receiver or liquidator meanwhile acts not only for the benefit of the bank, but for its creditors as well.

Vivares vs. Eng’r. Reyes (GR 155408)

Since a notice of lis pendens has been annotated on the titles of the disputed properties, the rights of petitioners are amply safeguarded and preserved since there can be no risk of losing the property or any part of it as a result of any conveyance of the land or any encumbrance that may be made thereon posterior to the filing of the notice of lis pendens. Once the annotation is made, any subsequent conveyance of the lot by the respondent would be subject to the outcome of the litigation since the fact that the properties are under custodia legis is made known to all and sundry by operation of law. Hence, there is no need for a receiver to look after the disputed properties.

Lucia Barrameda Vda. De Ballesteros vs. Rural Bank of Canaman Inc. (GR176260)

The cited Morfe case held that after the Monetary Board has declared that a bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes the trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors, including depositors. The assets of the insolvent banking institution are held in trust for the equal benefit of all creditors, and after its insolvency, one cannot obtain an advantage or a preference over another by an attachment, execution or otherwise.

Thus, to allow Lucias case to proceed independently of the liquidation case, a possibility of favorable judgment and execution thereof against the assets of RBCI would not only prejudice the other creditors and depositors but would defeat the very purpose for which a liquidation court was constituted as well.

Making Enterprises Inc. vs. Marfori (GR 152239)

Here, respondents submit that they have satisfactorily established their legal right over the Marsman Building. They alleged that the building and the income and rentals thereof are in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured by the apathy, neglect and fraudulent design of petitioners thereby rendering the appointment of a receiver both urgent and imperative. However, they failed to show how the building as well as the income thereof would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. They were not able to prove that the property has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and preservation.Because receivership is a harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme situations, respondents must prove a clear right to its issuance. This they failed to do.

We furthermore observe that in granting the appointment of a receiver, the CA merely concluded that respondents have sufficiently proven that they have an interest in the Marsman Building. It further held that unless a receiver is appointed, there is a danger of loss or material injury, considering that petitioners presently possess absolute control of the building and the rentals accruing thereof. However, there was no justification on how the CA arrived at its conclusion.

Koruga vs. Arcenas (GR 168332), Arcenas Vs. Judge Marella Jr (GR 169053)


Crystal clear in Section 30 is the provision that says the appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board. The term exclusively connotes that only the Monetary Board can resolve the issue of whether a bank is to be placed under receivership and, upon an affirmative finding, it also has authority to appoint a receiver. This is further affirmed by the fact that the law allows the Monetary Board to take action summarily and without need for prior hearing.

And, as a clincher, the law explicitly provides that actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on a petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership.


Thus, the courts jurisdiction could only have been invoked after the Monetary Board had taken action on the matter and only on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

NESTLE Phils. vs. Uniwide Sales (GR 174674)

Undeniably, supervening events have substantially changed the factual backdrop of this case. The Court thus defers to the competence and expertise of the SEC to determine whether, given the supervening events in this case, the SARP is no longer capable of implementation and whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated as a consequence.

Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well be within the latter’s proper jurisdiction.

The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.

ALEMARS Sibal and Sons vs. NLRC (GR 114761)

Since receivership proceedings have ceased and petitioners rehabilitation receiver and liquidator, Ledesma Saludo & Associates, has been given the imprimatur to proceed with corporate liquidation, the cited order of the Securities and Exchange Commission has been rendered functus officio. Thus, there is no legal impediment for the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter for the payment of separation pay.

Considering that petitioners monetary obligation to private respondent is long overdue and that petitioner has signified its willingness to comply with such obligation by entering into an agreement with private respondent as to the amount and manner of payment, petitioner can not delay satisfaction of private respondents claim. However, due to events subsequent to the filing of this petition, private respondent must present its claim with the rehabilitation receiver and liquidator of petitioner, subject to the rules on preference of credits.